Abstract. In this paper we look in detail at the curves which arise in the method of Galbraith and Smart for producing curves in the Weil restriction of an elliptic curve over a finite field of characteristic 2 of composite degree. We explain how this method can be used to construct hyperelliptic cryptosystems which could be as secure as cryptosystems based on the original elliptic curve. On the other hand, we show that the same technique may provide a way of attacking the original elliptic curve cryptosystem using recent advances in the study of the discrete logarithm problem on hyperelliptic curves.
Introduction
In this paper we address two problems: how to construct hyperelliptic cryptosystems and how to attack elliptic curve cryptosystems defined over fields of composite degree over F2.
As explained in [17] , there is currently no practical method which generates cryptographically secure Jacobians of hyperelliptic curves that have no special added structure. We present a method that will produce a hyperelliptic Jacobian related to a "random" elliptic curve, which is secure assuming one believes the discrete logarithm problem on the elliptic curve is itself hard.
For the second problem we turn our construction of hyperelliptic cryptosystems on its head and argue that this provides evidence for the weakness of the original elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. We stress that this does not provide evidence for the weakness of elliptic curve systems in general, but only those which are defined over the special finite fields considered in this paper. These fields are extensions of composite degree over the field ~'2.
Let
E: y2 + XY = X 3 + olX 2 q-t~
denote an elliptic curve defined over a field of characteristic 2, which is not defined over a proper subfield of K = ~q,. We let m denote an integer, which is defined in Lemma 6, that satisfies 1 < m < n. We assume that our elliptic curve satisfies one of the following conditions:
either n is odd,
(t) ~orm=n, [ or Trlc/F~ (or) = O.
We shall see that if n is even, then only approximately 1/(2q) of all elliptic curves over K are eliminated by the above condition. We shall prove the following:
Theorem 1. Let E (IFq, ) denote an elliptic curve satisfying condition (?). Let # E (]Fq, ) = ph, where p is a large prime. Assuming the map {b defined below does not have a kernel divisible by p, one can solve the discrete logarithm problem in the p-cyclic subgroup of E(Fq,) in time O(q 2+~) where the complexity estimate holds for a fixed value of n >_ 4 as q --+ o~.
The complexity in the theorem should be compared with the time estimate of 0 (qn/2) for the best general purpose algorithm, namely Pollard's rho method. We conjecture that the condition on the kernel of the map 4} is true in all cryptographically interesting cases.
The implied constant in the O(.) notation of the theorem contains a very bad dependence on n, of the order of 0(2 n !). Hence, for certain values of n the crossover point between the method of the theorem and Pollard's rho method may be at higher values of q than are used in practical elliptic curve cryptosystems. However, we exhibit experimental evidence that for n = 4 and around 1/q of the elliptic curves defined over ~'q,, the method of the above theorem is better than Pollard rho for values of q used in practice. For other elliptic curves over ]Fq, our method is only asymptotically better than Pollard rho, and further practical experiments need to be carried out to deduce whether the crossover point is at a size of q which is of cryptographic interest.
Our methods are based on the idea of Well descent on elliptic curves. Hence, much of the following is an extension of the work begun by Frey in [7] and continued in [9] , to which we refer the reader for further details. The details of elliptic curve cryptosystems which we shall require can be found in [3] .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give some simple examples of curves defined over a special type of field extension, for which hand calculation is particularly simple. In Section 3 we give proofs that the properties observed in the hand calculations hold in general. In addition, we construct an explicit group homomorphism
(o: E(~'q,) ----> Cl~
where Cl~ is the degree 0 divisor class group of a hyperelliptic function field over ]Fq. As we stated earlier, if the map r maps the cryptographically interesting subgroup of E(~'q,,) to the zero element in Cl~ then our method will fail to work. However, since it is highly unlikely that the kernel of r will contain almost the whole of the group E (~'q,), we expect that our method will work in all cryptographically interesting examples.
In Section 4 we show how our method of producing curves in the Weil restriction can be used to construct hyperelliptic cryptosystems, whilst in Section 5 we explain how one could possibly attack the underlying elliptic curve system using the Weil restriction. In Section 6 we report on an experiment using the index calculus algorithm of Gaudry on one of the curves of genus 4 produced by our method; this is used to help decide which genera should be used in practice for constructing cryptographic systems and which elliptic curve systems are made weaker by our methods. Finally, in Section 7, we turn our attention to other types of finite fields and discuss why the ideas of this paper are unlikely to work in other cases. In particular, for a large proportion of elliptic curves defined over F2,, where p is prime, we show that the methods of this paper give no decrease in the security of the resulting cryptosystem.
Example Curves in the Weil Restriction
Let k = Fq denote some finite field of characteristic 2, and let n > 2 denote an integer. In practice we are thinking of the situation where n is quite small and q is large enough so that q" > 2 I6~ Let K denote the field extension ~'q,, with k-basis {~0, 7tl ..... ~n-1 }-In this section we consider elliptic curves E over K, given by the equation
y2 + XY = X 3 + fl,
where/3 6 K. Notice that for such curves condition (t) is satisfied. 
where bi E k are given and xi, yi E k are variables. Substituting these equations into the equation for our elliptic curve, and equating coefficients of Ci, we obtain an abelian variety A defined over k, of dimension n, the group law on A being given by the group law on E(K). The variety A is called the Weil restriction, and the above process is called Weil descent.
Since A is isomorphic to E(K) as a group, the variety A will contain an irreducible subvariety B (we do not exclude B = A) with group order divisible by p. In curves of cryptographic interest, where p ,~ qn, this subvariety will either equal the whole of A or have dimension at least n -1, which can be seen by simple cardinality arguments. The variety B is the part of A in which our discrete logarithm problem is defined. We wish to find a curve C in A whose Jacobian contains a subvariety isogenous to B. Recall that B is the part of A which is interesting for cryptographic applications. Hence, we must have g = dim Jac(C) > dim B where dim B as stated above will be either n or n -1. For the applications we would like the genus of C to be linear in n, but it is highly unlikely such a curve exists at all. For the rest of this section we look at a special set of finite fields for which it is relatively easy to perform calculations. Our aim is to fix the ideas and provide a rich set of examples for the reader and for later in the paper. In the next section we show that the remarkable properties we observe in this section hold in general for fields of characteristic 2. The method used is a natural extension of the one presented in [9] .
We specialize to those fields K for which we can take ~i = 0 21 in our basis of K over k where 0 + 0 2 + 0 4 + --9 + 0 2"-~ = 1. The reason for choosing such a basis is so that the curves in the Weil restriction below have "small" degree and are easy to write down. One reason for this is that squaring an element represented by such a basis is simply a cyclic shift of the coefficients since 02" = (02"-1) 2 = (1 + 0 + 02 + ''-+ 02"-2) 2
However, such a basis does not always exist, since we require the existence of an irreducible factor of degree n of the polynomial h(x) = x 2"-~ +---+ x 4 + x z + x + 1 over the field k. Hence, we clearly require that the degree of k over F2 must be coprime to n, which we assume to be the case for the rest of this section. In addition, for a root 0 of such an irreducible factor we require that the set {0, 0 2, 0 4 ..... 0 2"-' } forms a basis of K over k. Hence, for this section, we have restricted the choice of q and n. For n = 2, we can always use the element defined by 0 2 + 0 + 1 = 0 whilst for n = 3 we can always use the element defined by 0 3 + 0 2 + 1 = 0. For certain higher values of n we can obtain many irreducible factors of h (x) of degree n over F2, and by the coprimality of the degree of k to n we see that such factors will be irreducible over k. For example, if n + 1 is a prime and q is a generator of the multiplicative group of the field Fn+l, then we can take 0 as a generator of K over k, where 0 n + 0 n-I + --. + 0 + 1 = 0.
To produce a curve of low genus in A one could produce a curve of low degree, and hence of hopefully low genus. Such a curve of low degree can be obtained by intersecting A with the hyperplanes given by x0 = xl ..... xn-t = x. Hence, we look at the subvariety defined by restricting X to lie in k. We obtain a curve s defined by the equations That we can obtain such sparse equations is due to our choice of basis of K over k. On elimination of variables we produce a curve in x and y = y0 of the form C:
where g(x) is a polynomial, depending on b0 ..... bn-1, of degree less than or equal to 2 ~. The polynomial g(x) is given by the formula:
where we make the identification bn = b0. The Jacobians of the irreducible components of the curve C are isogenous to abelian varieties which contain subvarieties of A, by the arguments of Section 2 of [9] . In examples of cryptographic interest the subvariety B of A has order divisible by a large prime p, hence the degree of the isogeny is likely to be coprime to p. Therefore, we can expect that the Jacobians actually contain a subgroup isomorphic to the subgroup of B of order p.
We give the following examples:
If the original elliptic curve is defined over the base field, i.e. b0 = bl, then the curve C has two irreducible components, each being an elliptic curve. In all other cases it is irreducible. Substituting a large number of elements for the parameters bo and bl into the equation for C2, we found that experimentally the genus of this curve always seems tobe 2. The curve is reducible when bo = bl = b2, in other words when the original elliptic curve is defined over the base field k. In all other cases it is irreducible, and experimentally the genus of this curve always seems to be 3 or 4.
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Experimentally, when the curve is irreducible, the genus of this curve always seems to be at most 8. This curve is reducible when b3 -~ b0 + bl + b2, and when it is reducible, one of the components is given by When C4a is irreducible it experimentally always has genus at most 4.
Note, in all the cases when the curve C was irreducible, it experimentally had genus equal to 2 n-1 or 2 n-1 _ I. In addition, we noticed that the irreducible components were always hyperelliptic. In the next section we prove that these remarkable properties hold in general for curves satisfying condition (I").
Hyperellipticity and Genus of Curves in the Weil Restriction
In this section we show that the observations of the previous section about the genus, irreducibility and hyperellipticity of the curves s hold in general. In addition, we show the existence of a computable mapping from E(]Fq.) to the divisor class group of a hyperelliptic curve. It is this mapping which translates the hard elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem into a potentially easier hyperelliptic discrete logarithm problem.
The Curve in the Weil Restriction
We now let K denote an arbitrary degree n extension of a finite field k of characteristic 2 of q elements. We make no assumptions about the existence of special types of bases of K over k as we did in the previous section. In this section, to keep track of which fields we are considering, all fixed elements of K are denoted by Greek letters.
We take an elliptic curve
where ce, fle K,/3 # 0. We do not assume condition (?) unless explicitly stated. We can form the Weil restriction as in the previous section by substituting the coordinate representations of X and Y and expanding with respect to any given basis of K over k, but for simplicity we assume that the sum of the basis elements is I. We intersect the resulting abelian variety A with the hyperplanes which mark out the subvariety of values of X which lie in k. The resulting subvariety of A will be a curve defined over k, in (n + 1)-dimensional space, which we denote by ~, as in the previous section.
We wish to study the curves ~ geometrically, so we consider ~ over the algebraic closure of k. In fact, we only need to go to the extension K. We wish to form the compositum F =/7o... Fn-I over K(x). Generally, a compositurn of field extensions Li / K can only be formed meaningfully when there is a covering field k such that K and all Li are embedded into/(7. If the Li/K are Galois all possible embeddings of K and Li into any k will give a K-isomorphic compositum. In this case we say that the compositum can be formed without ambiguity. Proof, We can form F without ambiguity because the extensions Fi/K(x) are all quadratic, hence Galois over K (x). More specifically, in order to generate F over K (x) we can choose a suitable subset of m equations of the equations defining the curve ~, such that adjoining tbt,, for 1 < i < m, to K(x) gives F, with tbl, a root of the left-hand side of the ith such equation. The remaining n -m equations of ~ will each have two solutions ~vj and tb~j + x in F.
Consider the homomorphism
The kernel I of this homomorphism is a prime ideal of dimension 1, since F is a field of transcendence degree 1 over K being generated by x, tb0 ..... ~bn_ 1 over K. This prime ideal contains the left-hand sides of ~ by construction of F. Therefore, I defines an irreducible reduced component of ~ having function field K-isomorphic to F. The statement about the number of these components follows from the possible choices of ~vj or Yovj + x in the definition of the homomorphism. This can be seen in detail as follows: Assume I were contained in the kernel J of a homomorphism ~ as above which maps woj to tb~j +x.
and tbvj = dp(f)/dp ( 
g) = @(f)/~p(g). Then gwvj + f ~ 1 c J and g(Wvj -']-X) § f ~ J,
hence gx ~ J andx 6 J because ~p(g) # 0 and J is prime. This is clearly acontradiction as x is not mapped to zero by ~.
[]
Artin-Schreier Properties
If we multiply the equations defining ~ by x -z, substitute si = wi/x + 3//2/x and z = 1/x, we see that another model for our curve ~ is The advantage of this model is that we can apply the Artin-Schreier theory as outlined on pp. 22-24 of [2] , pp. 275-281 of [14] and p. 115 of [ 18] . We use the following special version of Theorem 23.3 on p. 279 of [14] : (1) 
The field K is the exact constant field off (i.e. K is algebraically closed in F) and F is the compositum of the first m fields Fi over K (z), i.e. F = Fo . " . F,~-1. The Galois group ofF/K ( z ) is isomorphic to (Z/2Z) m . The action oft ~ Gal ( F / K ( z ) ) is given by r(si) = si or
where the first equality holds according to Theorem 4 and the second equality holds according to the first isomorphism theorem for groups. We have A o fq go(K(z)) = Ao N go (K) because applying go to nonconstant functions in K (z) would necessarily involve quadratic terms in z which are not to be found in t/2 1 1/2 A o. We abbreviate U = SpanF2{(1,/~o ) ..... ( ,/3~_t) }. Expanding the elements in A 0 into vectors in K 2 by taking the coefficients of z-t and z gives a surjective linear map A o --+ U. Its kemel is Ao N K. However, every element of the kernel must be a sum of an even number of the ~j because otherwise the z -l would not cancel. From Lemma 5 we conclude that A o A K = A 0 N go (K), and using A o A go (K) = A 0 fq go (K(z)), we obtain Ao/A o N go (K(z)) .-~ U. The formula for m is thereby verified.
In order to prove that K is the exact constant field of F we have to show that A (q K c go(K) (remember F = K(Z)(go-I(A))), However, again every u ~ A N K is congruent to a sum of an even number of the ~j modulo go(K). Lemma 5 gives u ~ go(K) and K is hence algebraically closed in F.
The statement about the compositum is seen as follows: The first m terms in the definition of A0 constitute a basis of the IF2-vector space A 0. This is due to the property that if the ith term is dependent on the previous jth terms for 0 < j < i -1, then the i + 1, i + 2 .... terms would be as well, because they arise by applying a to the ith term. Hence, F is obtained by adjoining roots of the first m left-hand sides of ~: to K (z) from which the statement follows. We now apply inductively some further transformations to (2) . We wish to determine a change of variables so that we obtain equations of the form t2+ti+Siti_l+yi=O,
Hyperellipticity and Genus
Where to = z. We take the first equation of (2) Next we prove the genus statement. In order to obtain F from L we need to adjoin to L a root of the left-hand side of the 0th equation defining ~. We take a closer look at the I/2 constant term (in so) of this equation u = 1/z + do + flo z ~ L, where we think ofz as a polynomial in c of degree 2"-l as in Lemma 7. Since this polynomial is separable, it factors in K [c] into irreducible polynomials with all multiplicities equal to one. The valuations ve (u) of u at the places P above z = 0 of the rational function field L (i.e. those places satisfying re(z) > 0) are thus all -1 and we obtain me = 1. We additionally know ~-'~-~(z)=0 deg P = 2 m-t , this is easily seen as we are working in a rational function field. The remaining places P of L have re(u) = 0 hence me = -1. Summing up, using Theorem 8, we finally obtain g = 2 "-1 org = 2 m-l -1.
Restriction to Smaller Constant Field
Up to now we have used the Artin-Schreier nature of the equations defining ~ (resp. 5) in an essential way, in order to obtain the statements on the hyperellipticity and the genus. Next, we need to restrict to a smaller constant field, and here we use the existence of a Frobenius automorphism on F which is due to the very construction of ~.
Lemma 10. The Frobenius automorphism a of K over k extends (nonuniquely) to a k-automorphism on F of order n or 2n, again denoted by a. We have roots si = ai (go) of the left-hand sides of ~ and accordingly roots ~)i = a i (COo) of the left-hand sides of~ with COl = xsi '[-t~i 1/2 for all 0 < i < n -1.
Proof. The Frobenius automorphism a extends to a k-automorphism of K (x) = K (z) by leaving x, resp. z, fixed.
The field F is obtained from K (z) by successively adjoining roots si for 0 < i < m -1 of the left-hand sides of ~ to K(z). Once these m roots si are adjoined, roots si of the other equations for m < i < n -1 are readily found in F and a will be defined on them. For m = 1 we can simply define a(g0) = s0. Assume we havem > 1 anda: The order of any such a on F must be a multiple of n since K c F and a has order n on K. Furthermore, an(go) = go or an(go) = go + 1 because an(g0) must be a root of the left-hand side of the first equation of ~:. We conclude that the order of a on F will be n or 2n accordingly.
The statement on the roots is clear and serves primarily as a definition for later use. [] It is at this point that condition (t) becomes important.
Lemma 11. If condition (t) is satisfied, then the extension a in Lemma 10 of the Frobenius to F can be chosen with order exactly n on F.
Proof. We now need to derive a precise condition for the order of such extensions a.
It will turn out that we have to choose a particular extension cr carefully if we want to obtain order n. The precise condition will be obtained from the precise value of cra (go), and is then compared with condition (t).
To begin with we start with any extension a of the Frobenius to F which will be changed later as required. It is convenient to employ the following technique: For 
Our k-automorphism a on F, depending on v, has order n if and only if we obtain zero for at least one of the cases in the right-hand side of (5). However, this is implied by (t):
The Proof. We let L' = F' r L. The relations between the fields F, F', L and L' are described in Fig. I . The fixed field F' of a has index n in F because a is of order n on F and it is clear that F' r K = k holds because a is of order n on K as well.
The automorphism a restricts to a k-automorphism of L of order n because it is the unique subfield of Note, that if condition (t) is not satisfied and ~r has order 2n, then we could have F' = L' in the arguments of the proof of Theorem 12, and hence we could not guarantee finding a curve defined over k which is hyperelliptic and has genus 2 m-1 or 2 rn-1 --1.
If the value of m is too small, then none of the irreducible components of C will have a Jacobian which contains a subvariety isogenous to the subvariety B of A. For example, let E (Fq,) denote a Koblitz curve, i.e. one defined over the field ~2. We will then obtain irreducible components of ~ of genus 1, by the definition of m. In this case the Weil restriction A factors as the product
A = E(]Fq) • B,
where B is an (n -I)-dimensional abelian variety defined over/Fq. The curve in the Weil restriction we have constructed has irreducible components whose Jacobians are isogenous to E(~q) and so we obtain no information about the subvariety B from our curves. This does not mean that one cannot find useful curves in A, whose Jacobian contains a subvariety isogenous to B. It just means that the curves we have constructed are not useful in this context. This is why we have assumed throughout that E is not defined over a proper subfield of K.
In view of Theorem 12 and Lemma 11 we assume for the rest of Section 3 that we are given an extension a of the Frobenius automorphism of K/k on F of order n and that a operates cyclically on the gi and ~)i while leaving x and z fixed. This can be reached when condition (I") is fulfilled.
Determination of an Explicit Model for F and F'
We describe how to obtain Artin-Schreier equations defining F over L and F' over L'. The corresponding hyperelliptic equations are easily obtained by similar (reversed) transformations as done in the beginning of Section 3.2.
To compute an Artin-Schreier equation in so and c for F over L for the generators m--1
go ~ K(E) c_ F and c ~ L, we only need to substitute (L_i + ~i=0 Lic2') -l for z in
,~1/2 the first equation s 2 + so + z -1 + d0 + P0 z = 0 of~, due to Lemma 7. In order to determine the action of cr on F we need to compute cr i (c) and o "i (S0) for 0 < i < n -1 as expressions in c and g0-This can be done using the operation of a as given in (4) and by tracing back the transformations of Lemma 7. Note that c is a K-linear combination ofz and the cri(g0) for 0 < i < m -I and that each of these can in return be expressed in c (z = f(c), resp. cri(g0) = fi(c) + s0 for suitable f, f,-6 K[c]).
Given c and s0 and the action of cr on c and s0 we can explicitly construct F' and L' as follows: Lemma Consider the Galois group of F/K(z). According to Lemma 6 it is an elementary abelian 2-group whose elements send each a i (s0) to a i (so) or o "i (s0) + 1. Now let r be the hyperellipfic involution on F/L, being an element of this Galois group. Since ~: fixes L and any of the ai(w generates F over L we must have r(ai(g0)) = ai(go) + 1 = ~r i (r(s0)) for all i. We thus see that a and r commute in their action on F and that hence r operates by restriction on F'/L'. We again consider the equations defining ~. Using Trx/k(#) = 1 we obtain r(g) = g + t and Trr,/z,(g) = g + r(g) = 1.
Choose Ix ~ K such that Trx/k(/x) = 1 and set ~ = TrL/L,(I,Z)~oC), = TrF/F, (#gO). We then have U = k(~) and F' = k(g, ~). An Artin-Schreier equation defining the field F' over L ' is given by
~2 + ~ + 1/z + YrK/k(]s + TrK/k(I.L2fl 1/2) Z + (TrF/F,(#2So) "k-TrF/F,(lZSo)) = O,(6)
Using

g2 = TrF/F,(]~2~2) = TrF/F,(I~2(~O + 1/Z + Ct + fll/2Z))
we obtain for the norm
NF'/L'(g)
Putting this together we thus arrive at (6). This equation is separable in g, and by construction it has coefficients in L'. Looking at the equations defining ~ gives that the valuation of gi at the zeros of z is only half the valuation of 1/z. The term in the second line of (6) is a K-linear combination of the gi and, as an element of L', has therefore no poles except at ~ = c~z. It is hence a polynomial in ? and we can conclude that the left-hand side of (6) 
Mapping the Discrete Logarithm Problem
We next address the question of mapping the discrete logarithm problem from E to F', where we again use the function field setting. We let CI~ The conorm COnF/K(e) and norm NF/F' maps we define as on p. 65 of [5] (see p. 63 and 239 of [18] ), on recalling that F is a function field extension of both K(E) and F'.
Both conorm and norm are homomorphisms of divisor groups, are well defined on divisor classes and map divisor classes of degree 0 to divisor classes of degree 0.
The point group E(K) of the elliptic curve E is isomorphic to the group of divisor classes of degree 0 of K(E) [16, p. 66, Proposition 3.4] . The mapping of the discrete logarithm problem in the point group E(K) of E is then achieved as follows: First we translate the problem into Cl ~ (K (E)). From there we use the conorm ConFtx(E) in order to map it to Cl~ and from there, using the norm NF/F,, to CI~ On composition we thus obtain a group homomorphism
ok: E(K) ~ Cl~
The important question now is whether the large cyclic factor of E(K) of order p is preserved by this homomorphism.
Lemma 14. The kernel of ConF/K(e): CI~ (E)) ~ Cl~ can only consist of 2-power torsion elements of Cl~ ( K ( E) ).
Proof. Let D be a degree 0 divisor of K (E). We have according to line 21 on p. 66 of [5] that [] According to the lemma the large cyclic factor can only be mapped to zero under by the norm NF/p,.
NF/X(e)(COnF/K(z)(D))
For very small values of m, such as those obtained for Koblitz curves, the kernel of ~b will necessarily be divisible by the large prime p. However, if m is larger than log2(n ), then the large prime factor of the order of E(K) will be preserved in many instances.
Hence, to solve our discrete logarithm problem
P2 = [I]P1
on E(K) we map degree 0 divisor classes representing P2 and Pl over to Cl~ ') using the map ~b. Set D1 = ~b(Pl) and D2 = r If we do not obtain DI = D2 = 0, which in practice is unlikely unless the elliptic curve is actually defined over a subfield of K, we can attempt to solve the discrete logarithm problem
D2 = [l]D1
in Cl~
The computation of images under ~b is in principle feasible by general methods, such as those used for computations with algebraic number fields and their extensions. Nevertheless, we want to give some rough indications on a method for our case. We assume that we can compute sufficiently well with finite fields and that we can define the function field of an irreducible affine plane curve, that we can compute the decomposition into places of the principal divisor of an element and of effective divisors and that we can evaluate elements at places. (Pl) can be computed as the greatest common divisor of the numerators of the principal divisors (x + x(Pt)) and (y + y(Pl)) taken in F. It is a divisor of degree 2 m-I according to Lemma 1 on p. 65 of [5] .
Let P1 be aplace of K(E) of degree 1 wherex, y ~ K(E) take the values x(Pt), Y(P1) E K, respectively (we assume for simplicity that x(P1) 5~ O, ~). The place Pl is clearly the unique common zero ofx + x(P1) ~ K(E) and y + y(P1) ~ K(E). Then COnF/K(E)
Let P be a place of F dividing ConF/K(~)(Pl) for some place P1 of K (E) of degree 1 (we decompose ConF/Ir to compute P). The place L A P can be described as the numerator of (f(?)), where f is the minimal polynomial of ?(P) over K and the principal divisor is taken in L. This is possible as ? has no pole at P because x(P) = x(Pl) ~ 0, which we have assumed above (~ and ~ are defined after Lernma 13 and given as elements of F and generators of F'). The place P can similarly be given as follows: Let h be a bivariate polynomial over K such that h(., ?(P)) is the minimal polynomial of y(P) over
K(~(P))
. f~ is defined at P because all of the cr i (y) are as x(P) ~ o0. We may represent P as the the greatest common divisor of the numerators of (f(?)) and (h(~, ~)), where the principal divisors are taken in F. This divisor consists of only P without multiplicities because as x(Pl) ~ 0 we have that L (~ P is unramified in F, hence there are at most two places in the numerator of (f(?)) and each of them occurs with multiplicity one. Furthermore, if the other place Q ~ P above L N P exists, then h (., ?) has degree 1 as the residue class degree of P over L (q P is 1. We also obtain ~(Q) = ~(P) +x(P) ~ f~(P) and h(fffQ), ~(Q)) ~ 0, hence Q does not occur in the numerator of (h(~, ?)) (see Theorem III.3.7 on p. 76 of [18] and its proof, h is one of the qgi and ~o is the minimal polynomial of 33 over K(~)). We are actually interested in determining the underlying place P' = F' N P of F', so we need to express the situation with coefficients in k rather than K.
For this we simply compute minimal polynomials f, h as above, but over k instead, and compute P' as the greatest common divisor of the numerators of (f(g)) and (h @, g)), where the principal divisors are now taken in F'. This divisor consists of only P' without multiplicities because of the same reasons as above.
Finally, N F / F'( P ) = f ( P , P') P' where f ( P , P') = n deg(P)/deg(P') is the residue class degree of P over P'. We will have that NF/p, (COnF/KCe)(P1)) is effective and that its degree equals n2 m-l , for the latter taking Lemma 2 on p. 66 of [5] and its proof into account.
A program for computing F' and 4~ given E has been written in KASH and is planned to be written for inclusion in the Magma computer algebra system.
Constructing Hyperelliptic Cryptosystems
Our method for constructing hyperelliptic cryptosystems is now immediate.
1. Fix a field k = lFq and an integer n such that K = IFq,. 2. Choose an E over K of order 2tp where p is a prime and l is a small integer. This can be achieved by generating curves at random and computing their group orders using the algorithm of Schoof [15] . 3. Construct the Weil restriction and the curve ff as we did in Section 3. 4. Find a model H of an irreducible component of ff in hyperelliptic form. 5. Check that the divisor class group of H over k has a subgroup of order p.
The final condition is necessary since we only know that a subvariety of A is isogenous to a subvariety of the Jacobian of H. Clearly in step 2 we should only choose curves for which condition (t) will automatically hold, i.e. n odd or TrK/F~ (~) = 0.
If in the above algorithm we choose n = 4, b3 = bo + bl + bz, with the special examples of Section 2, we will expect to obtain a hypereltiptic curve of genus 3 or 4, defined over k, whose Jacobian will, in general, have order 21 p. If I is chosen small, then we do not expect to obtain genus 3. If we choose n = 2, and a very small value for l, then we expect to obtain a hyperelliptic curve of genus 2, defined over k, whose Jacobian has order divisible by p.
Genus 4 Example
We consider an example where p ~ 28~ Clearly this is not large enough for cryptographic use, but we use it for illustrative purposes, both here and later. Curves with p > 2160 are just as easy to produce, they just require more paper to write down.
Consider the field k = IF2-,~ generated over IF2 by a root of the polynomial:
w 21 + w 2 + 1.
Let K = 1~284 be generated over k by a root of the polynomial Notice that b3 = b0 + bl + b2, and so we expect to obtain a hyperelliptic curve of genus 4.
The order of E(K) is computed using the algorithm of Schoof [15] and it is equal to 24p, where p = 1208925819614311295169073.
Our algorithm for producing a curve of genus 4 in the Weil restriction produces the curve C~ of Section 2. This curve has Jacobian also of order 24p. However, the curve C4a is birationally equivalent to the following hyperelliptic curve, which we calculated using the method in Section 3,
where G(x) is given by X 4 + w624429X 3 -t-wI248858X 2 -t-1/)1442662 X -}-I13386860
and F(X) is given by
"F to1541982X2 "-F 1/3137~ + 1131888298.
Genus 2 Example
We construct an elliptic curve over the field K = ~"216~ with group order equal to 5846006549323611672814739995379292203636332479268 which is four times a prime, p. We do not give the details of this eItiptic curve here for reasons of space. The Weil restriction, and our construction of the associated hypereUiptic curves, produces the following example of a genus 2 hyperelliptic curve defined over
Define k by k = F2[w]/(1 + ll34 + W81), The Jacobian of the hyperelliptic curve of genus 2 given by has order divisible by p. Its group structure is given by C2 x C2p and it is not subject to the Tate pairing attack [8] since p does not divide qk _ 1 for small values ofk.
Notice, that if the original elliptic curve E(~'q,) resists the Tate pairing attack, i.e.
there does not exist a small value ofk for which qn~ _ I ---1 (rood p), then the analogous test for the Jacobian is obviously satisfied for small values of k.
Attacking Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
The question remains as to whether the above construction provides either a mechanism to attack elliptic curve cryptosystems or whether the hyperelliptic cryptosystems proposed above are strong. In this section we discuss the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem in the Picard group of the hyperelliptic curves we have constructed. We assume a fixed, small, value of n and we look at the situation as q tends to infinity. For any group, the rho method (with Pohlig-Hellman) provides an algorithm for computing the discrete logarithm in time O (V/if) where p is the largest prime factor of the order of the group. For general elliptic curves, this is the best known algorithm. For the curves defined over ]~qn considered in this paper we obtain a complexity of O(q n/2) in general.
For hyperelliptic curves, we can obtain a better complexity by using an index-calculus method. If the curve is defined over ]~q and the genus is not too high (say at most 8), we can proceed as follows. We consider a factor base containing all the prime divisors of the Jacobian of degree 1. We can then proceed in two phases. In the first phase, relations are found between the elements of the factor base, whilst in the second phase we perform sparse linear algebra to solve the original discrete logarithm problem. The details of this algorithm are in [10] , but we give some details in an example below.
Theorem 15 [ 10]. There is an index-calculus style algorithm to solve the hyperelliptic discrete logarithm problem in a hyperelliptic curve of genus g over the field ~q which requires a factor base of size O(q) and which runs in time O(g3g! q log • q) + O(g3q 2 log y q)
for some fixed integer y.
Hence, for fixed values of g the complexity of this algorithm is O(q2+'), which is better than the rho method for a (almost) cyclic Jacobian of genus at least 5. However, it is unclear where the exact crossover point between the method of [10] and the rho method lies.
The theoretical complexity can be improved by reducing the size of the factor base. The smoothness bound is already minimal, but we can decide that some of the prime divisors of degree 1 are "good" (we keep them in the factor base), whereas others are rejected. If we set the proportion of "good" divisors to 1/l, then the time for finding a relation will be increased by a factor I g. However, we will need l times less such relations, and the cost of the linear algebra will be reduced by a factor 1/l 2. If we try to optimize the choice of l, we obtain I = ~)((q/g!)l/(g+l)) and the complexity becomes O(q2g/(g+l)+~), as q --+ ~.
In the following table we give the complexities of the discrete logarithm problem on the elliptic curves studied in the previous sections and on the corresponding Jacobians. We only look at the genera which are likely to occur in practice for the example curves in Section 2 and we ignore the q' term in the complexity estimate. Notice that for the "interesting" subvariety of Jac(C) in our Weil descent examples the complexity of the rho method on Jac(C) is equal to the complexity of the rho method on E(Fq,). For a general Jacobian of genus g the rho method has complexity O (qg/2). We stress that these complexities hold as q tends to infinity and with n and g fixed. Hence, for g > 4 we obtain a complexity which is better than that of Pollard rho.
In a context where we would like to build a hyperelliptic cryptosystem by a Weil descent, the Jacobians have to be almost cyclic, which occurs for the cases C2, C3 and C~. For the first two, this seems to be a good way to build a cryptosystem in genus 2 or 3; however, for the last one the index-calculus provides an attack with a better theoretical complexity than the rho method, and the security is asymptotically lower than with an elliptic curve cryptosystem with the same key size.
On the other hand, if we want to attack an elliptic curve cryptosystem, we see that for C4 and C4~ the complexity of index-calculus is better than for the rho method. Thus, asymptotically, it is a good way to attack such elliptic curve cryptosystems by transferring the problem to a hyperelliptic curve.
However, experiments have to be done for each fixed value of n and g to see where the crossover between the two attacks is, since the group operations in E (Fq~) and in Jac(C) will have different complexities. Such an experiment is carried out in the next section.
Solving a Hyperelliptic DLOG Problem
It is important to decide, not only for the Weil descent attack but also for our construction of hyperelliptic cryptosystems in genus 4, whether the method of [10] is practical in genus 4. In this section we consider the example given by the curve in (7) . The field size is q = 2 21 and the curve has genus 4, so the Jacobian has size approximately 2 84.
We solve a discrete logarithm problem in this group using the method of [I0] and then compare the running time with known efficient implementations of the rho method in an elliptic curve group of the same size. Since the rho method applied to a hyperelliptic curve will run slower than on an equivalently sized elliptic curve, if the method of [10] runs faster on the hyperelliptic curve compared with rho on an elliptic curve we will know that:
9 Genus 4 systems are less secure than the equivalent elliptic curve system, for field sizes greater than 221. We would then conclude that genus 4 hyperelliptic systems should not be deployed in real life. 9 Elliptic curves defined over Fq,, with m = 3 and q = 2 t, are weaker than those defined over F2p with p prime and of the order of nt.
We attempted to solve the discrete logarithm problem given by where the divisors are given in the reduced representation as in the paper by Cantor [4] . In this notation the point at infinity is implicitly subtracted with the correct multiplicity in order to obtain a divisor of degree 0. The above divisor D1 is a generator of the subgroup of prime order p ~ 28~ The factor base consists of all prime divisors of the form where c~,/3 E k = ~q, and p = (x + c~,/3), /32 + G(a)/3 + F(a) = 0.
To each a there are two corresponding values of/3, but we only choose one of these to be in our factor base, since the two prime divisors are related by the equation
in the divisor class group. To reduce the factor base even further we only use divisors in the factor base such that the binary representation of e has a bit representation with its three most significant bits set to zero, where the bit representation is in the polynomial basis with respect to w. Such prime divisors are called "good". In our example the number of such good divisors which make up our factor base F is 131294.
Consider the following general reduced divisor
with deg b < deg a < g. A necessary condition for this divisor to factor over our factor base of "good" divisors will be for the binary representation of adeg a-1, the (deg a -1)th coefficient of a(X), to have its three most significant bits set to zero. This gives us a simple test to eliminate lots of divisors which are not smooth over our set of good divisors. The algorithm proceeds as follows. We compute a set of "random" multipliers We then try to "factor" R~ over our factor base to obtain a relation of the form
p~F Due to our choice of factor base this factorization can be achieved using root extraction techniques over finite fields rather than general polynomial factoring techniques. We eliminate many divisors, before we apply root extraction, by our test for smoothness over the good divisors which we described above. The resulting tp lie in [-g ..... g], where for our example g = 4. We store the tp in a matrix as a column, which will have at most g nonzero entries in each column. Almost all relations we obtain will have t o 6 {-1,0, 1 } and will have exactly g nonzero values of tp in each column. After collecting more relations than elements in our factor base we can apply sparse matrix techniques modulo p, such as the Lanczos method, to find a nontrivial element in the kernel of the matrix. Using the element in the kernel we can then find the solution to the original discrete logarithm problem, with overwhelming probability, in the standard manner.
We ran the above algorithm on the above example. The relation collection phase took about 2 weeks of calendar time, using the idle time of a disparate set of machines. If we had run this task on a single Pentium 17 450 MHz, the timing would have been about 31 weeks. The linear algebra step took 64.4 hours using the same machine. After all this computation we determined the solution to Dz = [l]Dl was given by l = 12345678.
An equivalent calculation on an 84 bit elliptic curve, using Pollard's rho method, would have taken 44 weeks on the same machine, with a program with a similar level of optimizations applied. Since the crossover point is for a value ofq less than what would be used in practice, we can conclude that genus 4 hyperelliptic systems are weaker than an elliptic curve system with the same size group order.
Other Types of Finite Fields
Noncomposite Fields of Even Characteristic
In Section 5 we looked at what happens when n is fixed and we let q tend to infinity. In practice the elliptic curves over even characteristic fields which are used are ones defined over ~2p, with p a prime. Hence, we need to look at the situation where q is fixed and n tends to infinity.
Let E denote an elliptic curve, defined over Fzp where p is prime. We expect that the methods of this paper would produce a hyperelliptic curve of genus 2 p-1 over the field FE. It seems unlikely that one would, in general, be able to find a curve of significantly smaller genus in the Weil restriction of E(F2p) over F2.
However, using (1) one may be able to find, in very special circumstances, certain elliptic curves which have values of m slightly larger than log 2 p, for which there exist curves in the Weil restriction of genus slightly larger than p, as the following example shows:
Consider K = tr2[w]/(1 +w + w 127) and the elliptic curve defined by (a,/5) = (0, w), i.e.
E:
y2 + XY = X3 + w.
The number points on E(K) is computed to be #E(F2t:7) = 220 . 32 -45615671 9 395232781659164075412101.
Along the arguments of Section 3 we computed its Wei! restriction for n = 127 down to IF2, obtaining the hyperelliptic curve
The curve H has genus 127 and its Jacobian contains an element of order
We constructed this example by trying to make m as small as possible. It appears that one can obtmn very small values of m for/5 a zero of a polynomial with only 2-power coefficients, in the above case/5128 +/52 +/5 = 0. Another similar value for/5 may be obtained by a zero of the irreducible factor of degree 127 of x 2'~ + x 2 + x over F2.
In general, for random/5, a small value of m is very unlikely as we now show. Proof. By a change of variables we can put our curve in the form where ni denotes the degrees of the distinct monic irreducible factors of the polynomial X p -1 over F2. However, by Theorem 2.47 of the same book we see that this is equal to
where d is the number of distinct factors of the polynomial X p-1 + Xp-2 +... + X + 1 over IF2. Hence, around 50% of all elements in K generate a normal basis.
[] For general curves, where m = p and g = 2 p-I, one needs to bear in mind that although there is a subexponential algorithm for the discrete logarithm problem on hyperelliptic curves of large genus, it is subexponential in the size of the Jacobian which will be of the order of 2 g = 22p-I" However, we are really aiming for a subexponential algorithm in the size of the original elliptic curve, which is 2 p. On the other hand, for the very special elliptic curve in the above example, we indeed obtain a possible subexponential attack. Note that the method of [10] should not be used in this case since it is only efficient for "small" genera.
To obtain a subexponential algorithm for very large genera the methods from [1] , [9] , [11] and [ 13] should be combined after suitable modification for our hyperelliptic even characteristic case.
Hence, for curves defined over noncomposite fields of characteristic 2, we do not expect the techniques in this paper to contribute a significant threat to elliptic curve cryptosysterns. This last statement holds assuming curves are either chosen with values of m of the order of p, or are chosen to be curves which are defined over ~2, i.e. a Koblitz curve.
Odd Characteristic Fields
The question arises as to whether the process of Weil descent can be applied to fields of the form Fp, where p is an odd prime. Clearly we must have n >_ 2 and by similar arguments to those above n should not be too large.
The proofs in Section 3 relied heavily on the Artin-Schreier nature of the extensions. It appears hard to see how they can be modified to apply in the odd characteristic case. Indeed, in the few examples we have calculated we see that the resulting curves neither have such nice genera nor are they hyperelliptic in nature. Hence, using odd characteristic fields does not seem helpful in constructing higher genus hyperelliptic cryptosystems.
We turn to attacking elliptic curve systems based on fields of the form Yp,. This is an open problem which we now outline with an example: Consider the field Suppose the method of Gaudry could be extended to arbitrary Jacobians and not just hyperelliptic Jacobians with almost prime group orders. This at first sight does not seem too implausible but is the subject of ongoing research [6] . One would expect the resulting algorithm to have complexity at best O(p2g/(g+l)). Hence, to beat the asymptotic complexity of Pollard's rho method on E(]Fp3) we would require a curve of genus at most 3.
Naively mimicking our method of Weft descent in characteristic 2 one forms the curve C defined by the hyperplanes xl = x2 = 0, i.e. specializing to those x-coordinates which are fixed under the Frobenius automorphism. The resulting curve has genus 13 and is not hyperelliptic. Trying different types of bases for Fp3 over Fp and different hyperplanes does not appear to result in anything better. This is an avenue for further work and the construction of a suitably well behaved curve in the Weil restriction cannot be ruled out at present.
Conclusion
Let E(~q.) denote an elliptic curve over a field of even characteristic, which is not defined over a subfield of Ib'q~ and which satisfies condition (-~). Then we have shown how the Weil restriction produces a hyperellipfic Jacobian of genus at most 2 n-I which, for examples of cryptographic interest, contains a subgroup isomorphic to a subgroup of E (Fq,).
Using this observation we can construct hyperelliptic cryptosystems by first constructing elliptic curves using the School algorithm and then determining the associated hyperelliptic curve. This appears to be a way to produce secure hyperelliptic cryptosystems in genus 2 and 3. We recommend against using this method in genus 4 and above because of our experiment in solving discrete logarithm problems in genus 4, where we showed that the discrete logarithm problem in the Jacobian of a curve of genus 4 was easier than on an elliptic curve of the same group order, with a security level of at least 80 bits.
However, for fixed values of n > 4, this provides evidence for the weakness of the original elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. We have shown that for n = 4 and around 1/q of all such curves the crossover point, between our method and Pollard rho, is at a value of q less than 22t . However, for larger fixed values of n, say n = 11 or 13, the crossover between our method and Pollard rho will be much higher. Hence, further experiments are needed in determining the exact crossover point between the two methods for various values of n.
We have no evidence to suggest that the discrete logarithm problem on general elliptic curves, defined over fields of the form Yzp where p is prime, has complexity smaller than O (2P/2). Since these are the fields of characteristic 2 which are recommended in the elliptic curve standards, Well descent does not appear to be a threat to Standards compliant elliptic curve systems in the real world.
However, we do recommend that elliptic curves defined over ]F2,, for p prime, be checked to be sure that they produce a value for m in (1) which is of order around p or equal to one, as in the case of curves defined over F2. Only curves with these values for m should be deployed in real-world cryptosystems. In practice most elliptic curves over F2p will satisfy such a requirement, but it is worth adding this check to curve generation programs and to standards documents.
